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  Winter
      1998 (6.4)Pages 86-87
   Pipeline to
      Jeyhan:
The Turkish
      Perspective
 by Nihat
      Gokyigit Left: Photo showing the narrow straits of
      the Bosphorus.
 
 Right: Turkey fears oil tanker collisions
      like the one that occurred in the Bosphorus in 1994.
 
 For
      landlocked Azerbaijan, finding oil and pumping it out of the
      ground is only part of the struggle. An important question is
      still undecided: how will Azerbaijan transport its "major
      oil" to the world market? Which route will it take? Various
      proposals for main export pipeline routes have been put forward,
      but no single one has been finalized.
 One route goes
      by land from Baku to Supsa, Georgia. At Supsa, the oil is transferred
      by ship across the Black Sea and through Turkey's Bosphorus Straits
      before reaching the Mediterranean. Another route goes by land
      from Baku to Novorossiysk, Russia, where the oil then takes a
      path similar to the Supsa route: over the Black Sea and through
      the Bosphorus Straits.
 Turkey has repeatedly argued that these two options are problematic
      because the ship traffic going through the Bosphorus is already
      too congested. Any more ships in the waterway could create an
      environmental disaster.
 One possible land route would travel from Baku through Georgia
      and Turkey to Jeyhan (Turkish spelling, "Ceyhan"),
      a Turkish port on the Mediterranean. Potentially, the pipeline
      could also be used to connect Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan's oil
      to the world market using Azerbaijan as a "transit country,"
      perhaps via a pipeline to Baku across the bottom of the Caspian
      Sea.
 
 Turkey is pushing for Azerbaijan to follow this latter route,
      called the Baku-Jeyhan route. Here Nihat Gokyigit, co-chairman
      of the Istanbul-based company Tekfen, examines these issues from
      the Turkish point-of-view.
 
 
   Diversification As a
      newly independent nation, Azerbaijan must not allow its economy
      to become dependent on any one nation. In this context, the path
      that Azerbaijan chooses for exporting its oil is crucial.
 
 Left: Map shows the treacherous
      turns that oil tankers (the size of three football fields) must
      navigate in the Bosphorus.
 
 In order for the Caspian to be considered on its own as one of
      the world's main oil regions, it must not rely too heavily on
      Russia or Iran. Diversification is key. Likewise, the West is
      anxious to diversify its energy sources; countries like the U.S.
      don't want to rely completely on the Persian Gulf for their oil
      supply.
 For many of
      the proposed pipeline routes, Azerbaijan would have to depend
      on either Russia or Iran, potential competitors who have their
      own oil to sell. Using the Novorossiysk route, for example, would
      increase Russia's influence in the region. Directing the oil
      through Iran would be frowned upon by nations such as the U.S.,
      which still views Iran as a terrorist state. A Baku-Jeyhan route
      would mean that Azerbaijan would not have to rely on either of
      these two countries.
 Turkey is an independent outlet, and Azerbaijan's ally. It also
      has the potential to be one of Azerbaijan's biggest customers.
      Turkey has one of the largest fuel deficits in the region, as
      it only produces 15% of its own needs. The country consumes approximately
      30 million tons of oil each year, providing a strong demand for
      Azerbaijan's oil.
 Map showing
      the various pipeline route options from Azerbaijan and Central
      Asia.   Environmental Risks 
 Using
      either the Supsa or the Novorossiysk pipeline would mean transporting
      oil across the Black Sea. One problem with this process is that
      the sea is already very polluted.
 
 Rough waves and bad weather make it difficult for ships to cross
      the sea safely. Oil would have to be loaded on and off of ships,
      increasing the chance of a spill and even more damage to the
      environment. Numerous non-governmental organizations have already
      organized against the pollution in the Black Sea, and it is highly
      probable that increased oil traffic would spur on even more protests.
 Any oil transported via the Black Sea must pass through Turkey's
      Bosphorus Straits before it can reach the Mediterranean. The
      Bosphorus is an 18-mile-long international waterway that divides
      the city of Istanbul (pop. 12 million). At its narrowest point,
      the Bosphorus is 2,450 feet (750m) wide. The journey through
      it is a treacherous one-bad weather, fog and unpredictable currents
      increase the danger.
 
 Ships have to change course at least 12 times to navigate the
      narrow, winding waterway. Sending tankers the length of three
      football fields through this passage is equivalent to inviting
      an accident to happen. (In fact, 150 serious accidents have already
      happened.)
 
 The 1936 Montreux Convention guaranteed free passage through
      the Straits to any ship, day or night. But at the time, four
      to five ships passed through the Straits each day. Today the
      number is closer to 150, many of which are oil tankers. That's
      three times as much traffic as in the Suez Canal. Turkey is very
      worried about the environmental threat that this congested traffic
      poses, and believes that the framers of the Montreux accord did
      not foresee the danger of the chemical, explosive and nuclear
      cargoes now being carried through the Bosphorus.
 
 Close to the water lie important historical landmarks such as
      the Topkapi Palace (built in the 1460s), the Hagia Sophia Mosque
      (also spelled "Ayasofya" or "Ayia Sofia")
      (537 AD), and the Dolmabahche Palace and Mosque (1853). Every
      tanker that passes through the Bosphorus endangers lives and
      cultural landmarks. Additional tanker traffic from Caspian oil
      would significantly increase that risk.
 
 The Cost Factor
 Many different estimates for the Baku-Jeyhan pipeline have been
      tossed around, putting the cost at anywhere between $1.8 and
      $4.5 billion. Oil consortium Azerbaijan International Operating
      Company (AIOC) recently upped their estimate from $2.5 to approximately
      $4 billion. Turkey estimates that the pipeline is more likely
      to cost around $2.3 to $2.4 billion and is willing to help subsidize
      the construction. Estimates for the Georgian and Russian pipelines
      are generally lower, but don't fully allow for other potential
      costs, including costs to the environment. For example, a tremendous
      loss would occur if there were to be a major accident and oil
      spill in the Bosphorus Straits. What would it cost to clean up
      the polluted environment? What would it cost to buy insurance
      to cover such a catastrophe?
 
 Closure of the Straits due to an accident would block all traffic
      and choke the Black Sea states. What about the time a ship would
      spend waiting for the Straits to reopen? These costs must be
      considered in the estimate of any oil route that passes through
      the Bosphorus. A pipeline on the Baku-Jeyhan route may seem to
      be more expensive, but it is an investment that will save money
      (and the environment) in the long run.
 
 Today's Myths
 The
      major arguments by opponents of the Baku-Jeyhan pipeline are
      as follows:
 
 Myth
      #1:
      The Bosphorus Straits can handle the additional traffic from
      Caspian oil.
 
 Truth: There is not room for additional oil from the Caspian
      to pass through the Straits. Turkey recently passed safety regulations
      to slow down the traffic from cargo vessels, which increases
      by 15 to 20 percent each year. Additional tankers coming through
      with Caspian oil would spell disaster.
 
 Myth
      #2:
      There's not enough oil in the Caspian to justify building the
      Baku-Jeyhan pipeline.
 
 Truth: The oil reserves of the Caspian are estimated to be the
      world's second-largest, after Saudia Arabia. The 15 to 70 billion
      tons of reserves are believed to exceed those of Alaska and the
      North Sea. Accordingly, companies from 40 different nations are
      active in the Caspian Basin and are anxious to exploit its tremendous
      resources. In Azerbaijan alone, 16 production sharing agreements
      have been signed. Annual investments are expected to reach $2
      billion a year by the year 2001, reaching a total of $47 billion.
      There is plenty of oil in the Caspian. With this in mind, the
      proposed Baku-Supsa pipeline is a temporary solution, as it would
      only be able to transport half as much oil as the proposed Baku-Jeyhan
      pipeline.
 
 Myth #3:
      Lower oil prices mean that the Baku-Jeyhan pipeline is no longer
      cost-effective.
 
 Truth: Lower oil prices do put pressure on companies to minimize
      the cost of transporting oil. Even though prices for oil are
      at their lowest in more than a decade, interest in delivering
      Caspian oil to the West is still strong. If we use a reasonable
      estimate for the Baku-Jeyhan line, we see that this option is
      still competitive with other routes.
 Myth #4: AIOC has to support
      the Baku-Jeyhan pipeline in order for it to be built. AIOC, a
      consortium of 11 companies led by British Petroleum-Amoco (a
      new merger) has yet to take a firm position one way or another
      on the pipeline issue. They want to keep their options open as
      long as possible. Lately, AIOC seems to be leaning toward the
      proposed pipeline to Supsa. Due to historically low oil prices
      and low production volumes from the Caspian area at present,
      AIOC is skeptical about the Jeyhan pipeline and fears that it
      may not be commercially viable.
 Truth: AIOC is not the only decision-maker in this process, however.
      Other oil companies and consortia have large fields as well.
      They may very well decide to move forward with the Baku-Jeyhan
      pipeline with or without AIOC. For instance, Royal Dutch/Shell,
      Mobil, Chevron and the government of Kazakhstan recently agreed
      to undertake a study of the feasibility of an oil pipeline from
      Kazakhstan that would pass through the Caspian Sea to Baku, then
      overland to Jeyhan. Meanwhile, AIOC has decided to delay its
      final decision on the pipeline until at least early February.
 
 Widespread Support
 Heads
      of state in the Caspian region agree that the Baku-Jeyhan pipeline
      is the best choice for reaching the world market. On October
      29, 1998, the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan
      and Kazakhstan met in Ankara and signed an agreement to support
      the Baku-Jeyhan pipeline. The U.S. Secretary of Energy, Bill
      Richardson, signed the declaration as an observer. These leaders
      understand that a Baku-Jeyhan pipeline would benefit the entire
      Caspian region.
 
 The U.S. has also voiced a strong preference for the Baku-Jeyhan
      pipeline route. It favors this route because much of the pipeline
      would go through Turkey, the country's only NATO ally in the
      region. To keep Russia and Iran from participating in a main
      export pipeline, the U.S. has urged the Caspian states to adopt
      an "east-west corridor" for oil; the Baku-Jeyhan pipeline
      is by far the most feasible option that Azerbaijan can take.
 This article
      was based on a presentation given by Nihat Gokyigit at the Eurasian
      Transport Corridor conference in Washington, D.C. on November
      18, 1998. Mr. Gokyigit is a Co-Chair of the Tekfen Company and
      a Board Member of Deik. 
 From
      Azerbaijan
      International
      (6.4) Winter 1998.
 © Azerbaijan International 1998. All rights reserved.
 
 Back to Index AI 6.4 (Winter
      1998)
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